

National Center for Smart Growth Research and Education

Housing Market Impacts of Inclusionary Zoning

February 2008

Prepared by the National Center for Smart Growth Research and Education with funding from the National Association of Home Builders.

Contributing authors: Gerrit-Jan Knaap, Antonio Bento, Scott Lowe

Executive Summary

Many communities across the country face affordable housing challenges. An increasing number of communities are considering inclusionary zoning as a response. Inclusionary zoning programs, which require developers to sell a certain percentage of newly developed housing units at below market rates to lower income households, are politically attractive because they are viewed as a way to promote housing affordability without raising taxes or using public funds. Standard economic theory, however, suggests that such programs act like a tax on housing construction. And just like other taxes, the burdens of inclusionary zoning are passed on to housing consumers, housing producers, and landowners. As a result, inclusionary zoning policies could exacerbate the affordable housing problem that they are designed to address.

Although debate over the merits of inclusionary zoning has continued for nearly three decades, there have been no rigorous studies on their effects on housing prices and starts. We offer such an analysis here, estimating the effects of inclusionary zoning policies on single family housing prices, single family and multifamily housing starts, and the size of single family housing units in California over the period from 1988 to 2005. In our analyses, we are able to isolate the impacts of inclusionary zoning programs by carefully controlling for spatial and temporal conditions, such as the neighborhood or school district within which the house is located, and changing market conditions over time.

We find that inclusionary zoning policies had measurable effects on housing markets in jurisdictions that adopt them: the share of multifamily housing increases; the price of single family houses increases; and the size of single family houses decreases. These results are fully consistent with economic theory and demonstrate that inclusionary zoning policies do not come without cost.

Overall, we find that inclusionary zoning programs had significant effects on housing markets in California from 1988 to 2005. Although cities with existing or new programs during the study period did not experience a significant reduction in the rate of single family housing starts, they did experience a marginally significant increase in multifamily housing starts. More specifically, we found that in municipalities with inclusionary housing programs, the share of multifamily housing starts increased seven percent. The reasons for this shift are relatively clear when viewed in the proper context. Housing markets in California expanded rapidly over the 1990s as pent up demand exploded following the 1991 recession. The imposition of inclusionary zoning requirements was not strong enough to slow the overall rate of housing production but did cause a measurable shift from single family to multifamily housing production. We further found that the magnitude of this shift varied with the stringency of the inclusionary requirements.

We also found that housing prices in cities that adopted inclusionary zoning increased about 2-3 percent faster than cities that did not adopt such policies. In addition, we found that housing price effects were greater in higher priced housing markets than in lower priced markets. That is,

housing that sold for less than \$187,000 (in 1988 dollars¹) decreased by only 0.8 percent while housing that sold for more than \$187,000 increased by 5.0 percent. These findings suggest that housing producers did not in general respond to inclusionary requirements by slowing the rate of single family housing construction but did pass the increase in production costs on to housing consumers. Further, housing producers were better able to pass on the increase in costs in higher priced housing markets than in lower priced housing markets.

Finally, we found that the size of market rate houses in cities that adopted inclusionary zoning increased more slowly than in cities without such programs. Specifically, we found that housing in cities with inclusionary zoning programs was approximately 48 square feet smaller than in cities without inclusionary programs. Further, most of the reductions in housing size occurred in houses that sold for less than \$187,000. These findings suggest that inclusionary zoning programs caused housing producers to increase the price of more expensive homes in markets where residents were less sensitive to price, and to decrease the size of less expensive homes in markets where residents were more sensitive to price.

Introduction

As concerns about affordable housing have grown across the country, local governments have adopted a variety of affordable housing programs in response. An approach that an increasing number of local governments are considering is inclusionary zoning, which requires developers to sell a certain percentage of newly developed housing units at below market rates to lower income households. Although specific details of these programs vary widely, they are politically attractive because they are viewed as a way to promote housing affordability without raising taxes or using public funds.

No program, of course, is cost free. According to standard economic theory, inclusionary zoning acts like a tax on housing construction. And just like other taxes, the burdens of inclusionary zoning are passed on to housing consumers, housing producers, and landowners. More specifically, economic theory suggests that inclusionary zoning requirements act to decrease the supply of housing at every price, raise housing prices, and slow housing construction. As a result, inclusionary zoning policies could exacerbate the affordable housing problem that they are designed to address.

Although debate over the merits of inclusionary zoning has continued for nearly three decades, there have been no rigorous studies on their effects on housing prices and starts. We offer such an analysis here. Specifically, we present an analysis of the effects of inclusionary zoning policies on single family housing prices, single family and multifamily housing starts, and the size of single family housing units in California over the period from 1988 to 2005.

We find that inclusionary zoning policies have measurable effects on housing markets. Specifically, we find that in jurisdictions that adopt inclusionary zoning, the share of multifamily

Using the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight's house price index for California, this is equivalent to \$657,090 in 2007 dollars.

housing increases, the price of single family houses increases, and the size of single family houses decreases. We do not examine the purported benefits of inclusionary zoning, such as whether these policies increase the supply of affordable housing or serve to integrate low and high income residents. Therefore, we cannot ascertain whether inclusionary zoning increases social welfare. We demonstrate, however, that such benefits do not come without measurable costs.

Background

The first inclusionary zoning program was adopted in 1974 by Montgomery County, Maryland. The original Montgomery County ordinance required that 15 percent of new developments with more than 50 housing units be sold at a price affordable to low income households. In return, the county provided developers with a density bonus that allowed them to build at a density up to 20 percent higher than the maximum density allowed by zoning. Since then, inclusionary zoning policies have grown in number and variety across the country. For example, between 1990 and 2003, the number of California communities with inclusionary zoning grew from 29 to 107 (Powell and Stringham 2004). As of 2004, an estimated 350 to 400 local jurisdictions had inclusionary zoning programs, with the vast majority of these programs enacted in California, Massachusetts, and New Jersey (Porter 2004).

The economic effects of inclusionary zoning are similar to those of a tax on housing construction, as show below in Figure 1. As more units must are sold at a discount, the cost of development increases. Developers must raise the price on market rate units to compensate for the cost of discounted units. As a result, the price of market-rate housing rises and the production of such housing declines. This decline in housing production can manifest as both a reduction in housing starts as well as a reduction in housing size.




Figure 1: The Economic Effects of Inclusionary Zoning

The features of inclusionary zoning programs vary widely as shown in Table 1. The economic impacts of inclusionary zoning vary based on the different program features. A voluntary program that relies on incentives might not have any economic impacts, while a mandatory program that requires many, deep, and long-term discounts could have significant adverse economic effects.

Size and types of developments subject to inclusionary requirements	Some programs are voluntary, others impose inclusionary requirements only on large single family projects, others impose inclusionary
	requirements on all types of projects of all sizes.
Percent of units that must be affordable	Some programs require only five percent of new units to be sold at a
	discount, others require percentages as high as 30 percent.
The depth and duration of price discounts	The depth of price discounts often varies by the target population. For example, many require that units must be made affordable to those at 80 percent of median household incomes, others set different standards. The period of affordability often varies from 10 to 99 years.
The incentives or allowances offered in compensation	Most programs offer some form of incentives or compensation for providing affordable units. Incentives and compensation often include density bonuses, waivers of subdivision requirements, or fee reductions. Some programs permit payments in lieu of inclusionary units.

Table 1: Distinguishing Features of Inclusionary Zoning Programs

Previous research on inclusionary zoning has produced mixed results. While most research has been theoretical and dominated by case studies, some studies have sought to quantify the benefits and potential costs.

An early study by Clapp (1981) describes the potential reaction of developers to inclusionary zoning programs. Tombari (2005) similarly describes the potential adverse effects on housing prices and starts. Powell and Stringham (2004), in their study for the Reason Public Policy Institute, provide quantitative support for the concerns raised by Clapp and Tombari. Specifically, using data from the San Francisco Bay area, they provide evidence to suggest that inclusionary zoning makes market-priced homes more expensive, restricts the supply of new homes, and produces few affordable units.

A considerable volume of case study research, however, comes to quite opposite conclusions. Using data from Los Angeles, Rosen (2002) found no correlation between the adoption of an inclusionary housing policy and housing starts in 28 California cities. Multiple case studies by Calavita (1997, 1998) and his colleagues in California and New Jersey conclude that inclusionary zoning is a viable strategy for increasing the supply of affordable housing and mixing low and high income residents. The National Housing Conference (2002) draws similar conclusions in case studies conducted in Massachusetts.

In a study of the inclusionary zoning programs in the Greater Washington metropolitan area, Brown (2001) concludes that inclusionary zoning programs work best in jurisdictions with large amounts of undeveloped land and less effectively in dense, more mature metropolitan areas. The Non-Profit Housing Association of Northern California (NPH) and the California Coalition for Rural Housing (CCRH) (2003) published the results of a survey on the prevalence and the components of inclusionary housing programs in California. The study found significant variation in both the prevalence and the components of the programs in California, and

concluded that the effects of such programs depend in part on such programmatic details. In the study we present below, we test this proposition using data from the NPH survey.

Scope and Context of the Study

This study examines housing markets in local jurisdictions in California during the period from 1988 to 2005. For a number of reasons, California over this period offers a good setting for examining the impacts of inclusionary zoning. First, the state is large and includes many municipalities with distinct regulatory environments. Second, California is an often studied state with very good data available for housing market analysis. Third, and most importantly, inclusionary zoning programs became increasingly common in California over the study period. Time-series analysis of housing markets in California from 1988 to 2005 includes observations of many cities with existing inclusionary zoning policies, cities without inclusionary zoning policies, and cities that adopted inclusionary zoning policies within the study period. For each individual city in our sample we control for unobserved, time-invariant characteristics that might impact housing starts or the types of houses that are built. By doing so, we are able to isolate the impact of the inclusionary zoning programs, relative to other factors that might be influencing new housing developments; it is the variation in the use of inclusionary zoning across the state and over time that helps to isolate the effects of this policy from other factors.

Although the study setting is well suited for our analysis, any such analysis must be interpreted in the context of prevailing market conditions. As shown in Figures 2 and 3, housing starts in California were strongly influenced by national business cycles over the study period. Housing starts bottomed in the early 1990s as the national economy was in recession but increased fairly consistently as the economy recovered. Housing prices were similarly affected by national business cycles, as shown in Figure 4 for the San Francisco and Sacramento areas, but did not rise until 1996. The average size of a single family house, however, rose slowly but consistently over the study period, as shown in Figure 4.

While these trends primarily reflect national business cycles, housing markets in California have several location-specific characteristics of note. According to Landis et al. (2000), since the 1980s, housing markets in California have not produced housing units commensurate with the rapid growth in demand. The specific reasons for this are numerous, though limitations in the supply of land, capital, and infrastructure are all likely factors. Regulatory constraints probably also played a role. According to Pendall et al. (2006), local governments in California have adopted more growth management instruments than their counterparts in other parts of the country. Thus it is important to note that this study was conducted in markets characterized by strong demand-side pressures and significant and varied supply-side constraints.




Figure 2: New Housing Construction for All Cities in California




Figure 3: New Housing Construction for Cities in California with Inclusionary Zoning




Figure 4: Square Footage and New Housing Price in the San Francisco and Sacramento Metro Areas

Data and Descriptive Statistics

The data for our analysis are derived from a variety of sources and are used to compile two distinct sets. The primary sources of these data include the California Construction Industry Research Board (CIRB), the U.S. Census Bureau, and DataQuick News Service Custom Reports. (Details are presented in Appendix A.)

In the first set we use municipalities as the unit of analysis. We obtained information about the physical, demographic, and economic characteristic of cities throughout California, including information on location, regulatory environment, and natural setting. In addition we collected information about whether the municipality had an inclusionary zoning program and, if so, when the program was first adopted. Data were obtained for the period 1988 to 2005.

This first data set is used to study the impacts of inclusionary zoning on the number and composition (single family vs. multifamily) of housing units built, controlling for other factors.

		Inclusionary Zoning Cities			
Variable	mean	sd	min	max	
Off Site Allowances	57%	50%			
In-Lieu Fees	76%	43%			
Land Dedications	25%	43%			
Developer Credit Transfers	13%	34%			
Target Population Very Low Income	41%	49%			
Target Population Low Income	77%	42%			
Target Population Moderate Income	61%	49%			
Period of Affordability (years)	34	12	10	55	
Minimum Project Size to Qualify (units)	12	50	0	400	
% Units as Part of IZ	12%	6%	0%	30%	
Cities (N)	65				
Observations (years of data * N)	1011				

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

As shown in Table 2, of the 369 municipalities included in our study, 65 had adopted an inclusionary zoning program after 1989 but before the end of the study period. On average, the minimum project size at which a development became subject to inclusionary requirements was 12 housing units and the percent of units that must be made available to low income households was 12 percent. Of the 65 municipalities with inclusionary policies, 57 percent allowed off site allowances, 76 percent allowed in-lieu fees, 25 percent offered land dedication allowances and 13 percent allowed developer credit transfers. The average length of time affordable units must remain affordable is 34 years, although many municipalities have stipulated that the units remain affordable in perpetuity.

As illustrated in Figure 5, cities that adopted inclusionary programs are located throughout the state but are most common in the coastal areas, especially in the San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego metropolitan areas. In general, municipalities that had inclusionary zoning programs, relative to those that did not, had higher incomes, higher housing prices, higher growth rates, more neighbors with similar policies, and were closer to the coast.

In the second set of data, new single family homes sold were the units of analysis. For this set we collected information about newly constructed housing units in the San Francisco and Sacramento metropolitan areas, including physical features of the house, the neighborhood in which the house is located, and the policies of the pertinent governmental jurisdiction—including the features of any applicable inclusionary zoning programs. The second data set we use to estimate the impact of inclusionary zoning on the price and size of new homes sold.

Descriptive statistics of the new homes sold between 1988 and 2005 in the San Francisco and Sacramento Metropolitan area are presented in Table 3. The costs and size changes, mirrored in Figure 4, indicate the recession of the early 1990s, and the upward trend toward larger homes. The mean price of new home sales, even after correcting for inflation, increased steadily after 1995.




Figure 5: Inclusionary Zoning Programs in California

Year	N	Mean Cost (\$1,000s in \$1988)	Mean Number of Bathrooms	Mean Number of Bedrooms	Mean Floor Space (1,000 ft ²)
1988	14,580	167.68	2.31	3.07	1.74
1989	21,165	161.31	2.36	3.22	1.81
1990	18,694	180.66	2.42	3.35	1.90
1991	12,526	185.27	2.41	3.28	1.89
1992	11,158	176.67	2.36	3.24	1.83
1993	8,022	170.02	2.38	3.30	1.83
1994	13,189	167.12	2.39	3.35	1.85
1995	11,718	170.87	2.42	3.39	1.88
1996	13,813	175.26	2.43	3.37	1.91
1997	15,482	188.78	2.48	3.47	2.00
1998	15,768	195.86	2.49	3.49	2.06
1999	17,834	213.63	2.55	3.57	2.17
2000	17,977	233.04	2.61	3.62	2.30
2001	18,967	230.40	2.64	3.67	2.35
2002	21,954	235.82	2.60	3.58	2.34
2003	20,773	259.16	2.63	3.58	2.39
2004	21,827	304.15	2.68	3.61	2.41
2005	23,268	354.67	2.67	3.50	2.37
Avg.	16,595	209.46	2.49	3.43	2.06

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics - San Francisco and Sacramento Metro Areas New Home Sales

Methods

To explore the effects of inclusionary zoning, we conducted a multivariate statistical analysis of housing starts, prices and size. Our results are presented in Tables 4 to 7. Tables 4 and 5 present the stock and composition effects of inclusionary zoning on housing starts. Table 6 presents the effects of inclusionary zoning on housing prices. Table 7 presents the results of the analysis on housing size. Each of these analyses includes city-level "fixed" effects to capture market-specific differences between jurisdictions that are assumed constant over time.

In our analysis of housing starts we specify the dependent variable as the percentage change in housing units so that the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities—that is, the percentage change in starts resulting from a percentage (or unit) change in the dependent variable. As controls, we include city and year fixed effects which allow us to account for any unobserved city-level characteristics (such as proximity to the coast, elevation, or desirable amenities,) as well as characteristics that are uniform across cities, but that vary across time (such as changing market conditions or state-wide recessionary periods)

In our analysis of housing prices, we specify the dependent variable as the logarithm of the sales price, and in our analysis of house size we specify the dependent variable in 1,000 square feet of living space.² As in the housing starts models, we control for unobserved spatial and temporal characteristics of the houses that may impact their prices. Specifically, we control for the year and quarter that the home was sold, and we control for the neighborhood and school district within which the house is located. These controls allow us to carefully account for any outside factors that may influence housing prices, thus isolating the impact of the inclusionary zoning programs.

Results

Effects on housing starts. As shown in column 1 of Table 4, we find that inclusionary zoning programs had a small and insignificant effect on total housing starts over the study period. Our analysis suggests that housing starts in municipalities were 0.15 percent greater in municipalities with an inclusionary zoning program compared to those without. This estimate is not statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level, however.

As shown in column 2, we find that inclusionary zoning programs had a small and statistically insignificant effect on single family housing starts. Our analysis suggests that single family housing starts were 0.19 percent lower in municipalities that had an inclusionary zoning program compared to those that did not. This estimate, however, is also not statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level.

² To capture the potential endogeneity of the inclusionary zoning variable we include a one-year lag of the dependent variable in the regression. While this is not the ideal instrument for treating endogeneity we had no better variables that should be correlated with the inclusionary zoning variable and not with the dependent variable.

February	2008

Model Dep Var: ([HU _{t+1} - HU _t] / HU _t)(*100)	(1) Total Housing Units	(2) Single Family Housing Units	(3) Multfamily Housing Units
Inclusionary Zoning Program	0.1536 (0.1478)	-0.1885 (0.1918)	0.3601 (0.2605)
[HU _t - HU _{t-1}]	1.03e-05 (2.22e-06)***	4.32e-05 (4.00e-06)***	3.93e-06 (1.71e-06)**
Observations	5509	5509	5509
City Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES
Year Controls	YES	YES	YES
R-squared	0.07	0.14	0.01

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Table 4: New Housing Stock Change Models

As shown in column 3, we find that inclusionary zoning programs had a small and statistically insignificant positive effect on multifamily housing starts. Our estimate indicates that multifamily housing starts were 0.36 percent higher in municipalities that had an inclusionary zoning program compared to those that did not. Once again, however, this estimate is not statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level.

Effects on composition of housing starts. As shown in column 1 of Table 5, we estimate that the adoption of inclusionary zoning had a significant effect on the share of single family housing starts. Holding all other variables constant, the share of single family housing starts in municipalities that implemented inclusionary zoning programs was nearly seven percentage points lower than those municipalities that did not implement such a program. This result is very significant—the chances are less than 0.01 percent that there was no effect of inclusionary zoning on this ratio of housing mix.

As shown in columns 2 and 3 of Table 5, respectively, the effect of inclusionary zoning on housing mix varied significantly with the percent of housing units required to be sold to low-income households and with the minimum project size subject to inclusionary zoning requirements. Compared to jurisdictions without inclusionary zoning programs, municipalities with an inclusionary zoning program where the percentage of new homes to be sold at a discount requirement was more severe (greater than 10 percent of a project's units), experienced a 12 percent shift from single family to multifamily housing starts. Similarly, the inclusionary zoning regulation resulted in a 10 percent shift from single family to multifamily housing starts in jurisdictions with an inclusionary zoning program where the threshold that required participation in the inclusionary zoning program was more severe (less than 10 unit projects).

^{*} significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Dependent Variable: % SF Units _{t+1} (*100)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Inclusionary Zoning Program	-6.8868 (1.9365)***		
Inclusionary Zoning Program requiring 10% or less of the units for low-income households		-2.9150 (2.5151)	
Inclusionary Zoning Program requiring more than 10% of the units for low-income households		-12.1033 (2.8076)***	
Inclusionary Zoning Program and a threshold less than 10 units			-9.6961 (2.1297)***
Inclusionary Zoning Program and a threshold of 10 or more units			-0.9995 (3.7497)
% Single Family Units _t	0.0671 (0.0173)***	0.0664 (0.01734)***	0.0663 (0.01734)***
Observations	5880	5880	5880
City Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES
Year Controls	YES	YES	YES
R-squared	0.03	0.03	0.03

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Table 5: New Housing Composition Change Models

Dependent Variable: ln(cost) in 1988 dollars	(1)	(2)	(3)
House Price Sample (\$1988)	ALL	<= \$187,000	> \$187,000
Inclusionary Zoning Program	0.022 (0.003)***	-0.008 (0.004)***	0.050 (0.003)***
Observations	298,715	149,253	149,462
Beds, Baths, Baths and Floor Space Included	YES	YES	YES
Census Block Group Boundary Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES
Year of Sale Controls	YES	YES	YES
Quarter of Sale Controls	YES	YES	YES
School District Boundary Controls	YES	YES	YES
Lot Size Controls	YES	YES	YES
Dummies for Missing Data	YES	YES	YES
R-squared (within)	0.60	0.31	0.58

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Sample includes all Bay Area + Sacramento new house sales of homes with less than 12 bedrooms or bathrooms, with less than 30,000 square feet of living space and more than 250 square feet of living space, and that cost more than \$20k.

Table 6: The Effect of Inclusionary Zoning on New Housing Values

Effects on prices of new homes sold. Our estimates of the effects of inclusionary zoning programs on housing prices are presented in Table 6. As shown in column 1, we estimate that inclusionary zoning programs raise housing prices by approximately 2.2 percent. Also, as shown in columns 2 and 3, we estimate that the effects on inclusionary zoning are greater in higher

^{*} significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

^{*} significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

priced housing markets. Specifically, we estimate that inclusionary zoning programs lowered the price of housing that sold for less than \$187,000 by about 0.8 percent and increased the price of housing that sold for more than \$187,000 by about 5.0 percent.

Effects on the size of new homes sold. Our estimates of the effects of inclusionary zoning on the size of single family housing are presented in Table 7. As shown in column 1, we estimate that the implementation of an inclusionary zoning program lowers the mean housing size by approximately 48 square feet. Further, as shown in columns 2 and 3, the effects of inclusionary zoning on housing size are greater on lower priced homes. Specifically, we estimate that houses that sold for less than \$187,000 are approximately 33 square feet smaller in inclusionary zoning jurisdictions while houses that sold for more than \$187,000 are larger in inclusionary zoning jurisdictions by a statistically insignificant amount.

Dependent Variable: New House Interior Square Footage (Floor Space) / 1000	(1)	(2)	(3)
House Price Sample (\$1988)	ALL	<= \$187,000	> \$187,000
Inclusionary Zoning Program	-0.048 (0.006)***	-0.033 (0.007)***	0.001 (0.008)
Observations	298,715	149,253	149,462
Beds, Baths and Baths Included	YES	YES	YES
Census Block Group Boundary Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES
Year of Sale Controls	YES	YES	YES
Quarter of Sale Controls	YES	YES	YES
School District Boundary Controls	YES	YES	YES
Lot Size Controls	YES	YES	YES
Dummies for Missing Data	YES	YES	YES
R-squared (within)	0.53	0.52	0.46

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Sample includes all Bay Area + Sacramento new house sales of homes with less than 12 bedrooms or bathrooms, with less than 30,000 square feet of living space and more than 250 square feet of living space, and that cost more than \$20,000.

Table 7: The Effect of Inclusionary Zoning on Square Footage of New Houses

Conclusions

Although inclusionary zoning programs have been around for some time, they remain controversial. Proponents argue that such programs are effective tools for increasing the supply of affordable housing and for helping to integrate low and high income residents. Opponents argue that such programs impose cost burdens on developers, increase the price of market rate units and lower the supply of market rate housing. This study provides no new information about the validity of the arguments of the proponents; it does, however, offer new information about the arguments of the opponents.

Overall, we find that inclusionary zoning programs had significant effects on housing markets in California from 1988 to 2005. Although cities with existing or new programs during the study

^{*} significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

period did not experience a significant reduction in the rate of single family housing starts, they did experience a statistically insignificant increase (at a 90 percent confidence level) in multifamily housing starts. As a consequence, we found that cities with inclusionary housing programs experienced a significant and relatively large increase in the ratio of multifamily to single family housing production. That is, having an inclusionary housing program increased a city's multifamily housing starts share by seven percent. The reasons for this shift are relatively clear. Housing markets in California cities, persistently constrained by regulatory barriers, expanded rapidly during the 1990s as the national and California economies recovered from the 1991 recession. Inclusionary zoning programs, in cities where they were adopted, placed a small additional burden on single family development and less of a burden on multifamily development. Under the pressure of growing demand, single family starts declined slightly while multifamily starts increased significantly. This caused a significant shift toward multifamily housing development. This shift was greater in cities that required a larger percentage of the new units to be sold at below market rates, and in cities that required inclusionary units in developments with smaller numbers of units. There was no net effect, however, on total housing starts.

We also found that housing prices in cities that adopted inclusionary zoning increased about 2-3 percent faster than cities that did not adopt such policies. In addition, we found that housing price effects were greater in higher priced housing markets than in lower priced markets. That is, housing that sold for less than \$187,000 (in 1988 dollars) decreased by only 0.8 percent while housing that sold for more than \$187,000 increased by 5.0 percent. These findings suggest that housing producers did not in general respond to inclusionary requirements by slowing the rate of construction of single family housing but did pass the increase in production costs on to housing consumers. Further, housing producers were better able to pass on the increase in costs in higher priced housing markets than in lower priced housing markets.

Finally, we found that the size of market rate houses in cities that adopted inclusionary zoning increased more slowly than in cities without such programs. Specifically, we found that housing in cities with inclusionary zoning programs was approximately 48 square feet smaller than in cities without inclusionary programs. Further, most of the reductions in housing size occurred in houses that sold for less than \$187,000. These findings suggest that inclusionary zoning programs caused housing producers to increase the price of more expensive homes in markets where residents were less sensitive to price, and to decrease the size of less expensive homes in markets where residents were more sensitive to price.

Once again, these results must be understood in context. The California housing market expanded rapidly over the 1990s as pent up demand exploded following the 1991 recession. The imposition of inclusionary zoning requirements was not strong enough to slow the overall rate of housing production but did cause a measurable shift from single family to multifamily housing production. The magnitude of this shift varied with the stringency of the inclusionary requirements. The imposition of inclusionary requirements was strong enough, however, to cause a rise in housing prices and a reduction in housing size. Price effects were larger in high priced markets while size effects were larger in low priced markets.

Housing Market Impacts of Inclusionary Zoning Programs

February 2008

These results are fully consistent with economic theory and demonstrate that inclusionary zoning policies do not come without cost. In robust housing markets, like those of California during the 1990s, inclusionary zoning requirements were not strong enough to slow the rate of housing production, although they did cause housing prices to rise and housing size to fall. In less robust markets, it is more likely that inclusionary requirements have stronger impacts on housing starts than on housing prices and size. Confirmation of such speculation, however, is beyond the scope of this study.

References

Brown, Karen Desterol. "Expanding Affordable Housing Through Inclusionary Zoning: Lessons From the Washington Metropolitan Area," The Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy (October 2001).

Calavita, Nico and Kenneth Grimes. "Inclusionary Housing in California: The Experience of Two Decades," *Journal of the American Planning Association* 64 (2) (1998): 150-169.

Calavita, Nico, Kenneth Grimes and Alan Mallach. "Inclusionary Housing in California and New Jersey: A Comparative Analysis," *Housing Policy Debate* 8 (1) (1997): 109-142.

California Coalition for Rural Housing and the Non-Profit Housing Association of Northern California. "Inclusionary Housing in California: 30 Years of Innovation," (2003).

Clapp, John M. "The Impact of Inclusionary Zoning on the Location and Type of Construction Activity," *Journal of the American Real Estate & Urban Economics Association*, 9 (1981): 436-456.

Landis, John D., Michael Smith-Heimer, Michael Larice, Michael Reilly, Mary Corley and Oliver Jerchow. "Raising the Roof: California Housing Development Projections and Constraints, 1997-2020," Institute of Urban and Regional Development at University of California at Berkeley (2000).

National Housing Conference, The. "Inclusionary Housing: Lessons learned in Massachusetts," *NHC Affordable Housing Policy Review* 2 (1) (January 2002).

National Housing Conference, The. "Inclusionary Zoning: The California Experience," *NHC Affordable Housing Policy Review* 3 (1) (February 2004).

Pendall, Rolf, Robert Puentes, and Jonathan Martin. In *Traditional to Reformed: A Review of the Land Use Regulations in the Nation's 50 Largest Metropolitan Areas*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, Metropolitan Policy Program, August 2006.

Porter, Douglas R. *Inclusionary Zoning for Affordable Housing*. Washington, D.C.: Urban Land Institute, 2004.

Powell, Benjamin and Edwards Stringham. "Housing Supply and Affordability: Do Affordable Housing Mandates Work?" Policy Study No. 318, Reason Foundation (April 2004).

Rosen, David Paul & Associates. "City of Los Angeles Inclusionary Housing Study," prepared for the Los Angeles Housing Department (September 25, 2002).

Tombari, Edward A. "Smart Growth, Smart Choices Series: The Builder's Perspective on Inclusionary Zoning," National Association of Home Builders (November 2005).

Appendix A

Our data set has four main components: (1) measures of housing construction in California's cities between 1990 and 2005; (2) city-specific data relating to the physical, demographic and economic characteristics of California's cities; (3) city-specific data relating to the inclusionary zoning regulations that have been implemented in California's cities; and (4), Consumer Price Index data.

1. California Housing Construction Data

1.1 Changes in Housing Stock and Composition

Aggregate house construction data was provided by the California Construction Industry Research Board (CIRB). The data include total new residential building permit counts, by number of units, for all cities in the 58 California Counties from 1990 through 2005. The building classification was provided by the CIRB, in which the new residential building permits were divided into two groups: Single Family Housing, which includes detached, semi-detached, rowhouse and townhouse units; and Multifamily Housing, which includes duplexes, 3-4 unit structures and apartment-type structures with five units or more.³

The existing housing stock in each city was collected from the U.S. Census Bureau for the 1990 census year. This estimate includes a measure of the number of single family houses and multifamily houses in each city, in 1990. The intra-annual housing stock totals for the 1991-2005 housing years are calculated by taking the 1990 Census housing stock, and adding the number of homes constructed in the previous year.⁴ These estimates were conducted for single family, multifamily, and the total number of housing units.

1.2 New House Construction in the San Francisco and Sacramento Metropolitan Areas

Individual new house sales data was collected from DataQuick News Service Custom Reports. The initial dataset that was received from DataQuick included 415,303 observations, covering all new house sales in the San Francisco and Sacramento Metropolitan Areas for the 1988 through 2005 timeframe. Specifically, the data include new single family and multifamily housing sales

³ Rowhouses and townhouses are included in single-family when each unit is separated from the adjacent unit by an unbroken ground-to-roof party or fire wall. Condominiums are included in single-family when they are of zero-lot-line or zero-property-line construction; when units are separated by an air space; or, when units are separated by an unbroken ground-to-roof party or fire wall. Multi-family housing also includes condominium units in structures of more than one living unit that do not meet the above single-family housing definition.

housing stock in year t, and HG is the number of homes built in year t. This process assumes that there is no loss in the existing housing stock, and that the new housing stock is not a replacement of the old stock.

⁴ Therefore the housing stock in year t is represented by: $HS_{1990+t} = HS_{1990} + \sum_{t=1}^{16} HG_{1989+t}$, where HS is the total

in 11 counties in the San Francisco Area (Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Monterey, Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Solano, and Sonoma counties) and eight counties in the Sacramento area (Butte, El Dorado, Fresno, Nevada, Placer, Sacramento, San Joaquin, and Stanislaus counties).

Unfortunately, a number of observations in the initial dataset were missing house characteristics data. Of the initial data provided by DataQuick, approximately 298,715 observations were of a quality that they could be used in the hedonic estimation. Of the 298,715 observations, each sale includes the following data: the parcel number of the house; the date of sale (day, month, and year); the price of sale; the city, zip code, and latitude/longitude of the house; the lot size, number of bathrooms, number of bedrooms, and square footage of the house.

2. City-specific Housing Attributes

2.1 Geographic Characteristics of the Data

In the process of creating our dataset, we utilized four different levels of geography from the United States Census: Block Group, Zip Code, City, and County. The Census geographic files were provided in a geographic projection as ArcView Geographic Information System (GIS) Cartographic Boundary Files, and have been normalized to the 2000 geography by Geolytics Inc.

The main unit of measurement in our analysis of the supply of housing is the Consolidated City. A total of 468 cities were reported in the year 2005, four of which do not match with our Census geographies because they were incorporated after the year 2000 (Aliso Viejo, Elk Grove, Goleta and Rancho Cordova).

The ArcView GIS Consolidated City shapefiles were used with a GIS line-shapefile that was constructed to represent the California coast. The shortest distance (in kilometers) from the centroid of each city to the coast was then calculated using ArcView GIS, with a range from a maximum of 312 km (Needles, in San Bernardino County,) to less than a few hundred meters.

2.2 Census Data

The demographic variables in our analysis come from Geolytics' provision of the 1990 U.S. Census Long Form files, and include "Places" data (Cities, Towns, and Incorporated Places that have legally prescribed boundaries, powers, and functions) for the Cities and Towns in California. The data include:

⁵ Of the initial 415,303 observations received from DataQuick, 5,679 were missing sales price information, 98,805 were missing bed, bath and square-footage information, and 67,788 were missing latitude and longitude information (note that some of the observations listed above overlap in terms of omitted information). An additional 438 observations with latitude and longitude information were located outside of the San Francisco and Sacramento areas.

- 1. Total population;
- 2. Total land area;
- 3. Ethnicity (percent White, Hispanic, Black, Asian, and Other for each city);
- 4. Per-capita income;
- 5. Household income;
- 6. Total housing units;
- 7. Percent vacant housing units;
- 8. Percent owner-occupied housing units;
- 9. Percent single family detached housing units; and,
- 10. Median year of construction for all housing units.

The total population and total land area variables were used to construct a population density value for each city. This variable is measured as the total population of the city divided by the total land area of the city in square kilometers.

2.3 School District Boundaries

In California, a student's "home school district," be it elementary or secondary, is assigned by virtue of the residential location. More often than not, a student will attend the nearest school in the district, but this is not uniformly true. Any student can attend any school within the district, as long as there is available space; likewise, a student may petition to attend a school outside of the district, again dependent on available space. For this reason, the 1:1 assignment of school-to-student without information on that assignment was impossible to create.

However, we were able to control for the different school district boundaries. In our model, each house sales observation was spatially matched to its respective elementary and secondary school district. Cartographic boundary files of the school districts, as defined in the year 2000, were collected from the U.S. Census Bureau.

3. Inclusionary Zoning Data

City-level data on inclusionary zoning regulations were taken from the *Survey of Inclusionary Housing Policies* (2003), conducted by the California Coalition for Rural Housing, and the Non-Profit Housing Association of Northern California, during 2002 and early 2003. The survey includes detailed information about how local inclusionary zoning programs are structured.⁶ The data collected from the survey include:

- 1. The year the inclusionary zoning policy was adopted;
- 2. The minimum project size;
- 3. The percentage of units required;
- 4. The targeted income group (very low, low, middle income);

⁶ The Inclusionary Housing Policies sample includes 95 cities and 12 counties (not including San Francisco County, which incorporates a single city). These 95 cities represent roughly 20.3% of the total sample of cities in California.

- 5. Alternatives to construction (off-site allowances, in-lieu fees, land dedication allowance, and developer credit transfers); and,
- 6. The length of affordability.

Missing information from the survey was collected through personal contact with those cities or counties that did not respond to the survey, or taken from the Reason Public Policy Institute's *Housing Supply and Affordability Survey* (the list of unresponsive cities includes Fairfax, Los Gatos, Port Hueneme, Del Mar, Gonzales, Long Beach, Morro Bay, Vista, Woodland, and Menlo Park).

4. Consumer Price Index Data

Consumer Price Index (CPI) data were used to normalize the house sales price to a base year of 1988. The CPI statistics were provided by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. The annual average CPI was calculated for all urban consumers, using all consumable items, for residents of the San Francisco – Oakland – San Jose Metropolitan Statistical Area in California, using a base year of 1988. These data are publicly available from the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics under series IDs (CUURA422SA0) and (CUUSA422SA0).

⁷ As a robustness check, different CPI values were used to normalize the house sales price data, including an all-US urban average, a West Coast urban average, and the all-US Housing average (which is only available at the all-US average level of aggregation). The SF-Oakland-SJ CPI is, on average, 1.5 to 3.7% larger than the other CPIs used, with a max difference of +7.1%, and a minimum difference of -2.3%, depending on the year. Our model results are robust to the type of CPI used, but the AIC goodness of fit test prefers the SF-Oakland-SJ CPI for the normalization method.